The Kroll Lens: Monitoring Class Action Settlements—2026, Volume XV

Corrente v. The Charles Schwab Corp.,

No. 4:22-cv-470, 2025 WL 3270219 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2025) (Spero, Mag. J.)

Plaintiffs brought suit against merging investment companies, alleging that the merger lessened competition in violation of the Clayton Act. Plaintiffs sought monetary damages and injunctive relief as a class action. The parties reached settlement, and 70 objectors raised arguments about standing, notice, lack of monetary benefit and disproportionate fees. However, none of the objectors appeared at the fairness hearing, after which the Court granted the parties' motion for final approval.

In support of its decision, the Court first considered standing, applying the Kohen and Denney tests. The Court found that standing existed in the action, because the named Plaintiffs and absent class members include only "persons who can allege causation and injury," satisfying both tests by identifying an injury in fact and appropriately limiting the class to current U.S. brokerage customers.

Turning to certification, the Court first found ascertainability was met by limiting the class definition to current brokerage customers who could be readily identified from company records. For numerosity, the Court found joinder would be impracticable, looking beyond the number of millions of class members, but to the complexity of antitrust litigation and the nationwide scope of the class. For commonality, the Court found several common questions, including whether the merger harmed all class members under the Clayton Act's competition protections. The Court also found typicality was met under the same legal theory. Finally, for adequacy, the Court found no conflict between plaintiffs and the class, that plaintiffs had been active in the litigation and that class counsel was competent and experienced.

 

Turning to Rule 23(b)(2), the Court found the class met the standard for an injunctive relief class by alleging common harm, seeking only injunctive relief and requesting specific forms of that relief. The Court also appointed class counsel and found notice was sufficient and reasonable, noting that the 70 objections received represented a minuscule percentage of the total class size.

At final approval, the Court found plaintiffs and counsel had provided a meaningful benefit to the class. No evidence of collusion had been submitted; instead, the parties had conducted arm’s-length negotiations. The Court also considered adequacy of relief under the Reed test and found the settlement adequate in light of the risks of continued litigation, discovery to date, the probability of success on the merits and the range of potential recovery. The Court also found the fee award reasonable and concluded that the injunctive reliefs settlement met the equitable treatment factor under Rule 23(e)(2)(D). Finally, the Court found no meaningful opposition to the settlement from class counsel, plaintiffs or other class members.

The Court separately addressed objectors' remaining arguments by grouping them into categories. On standing, the Court found Plaintiffs had demonstrated "imminent" injury, not solely past harm. On notice, the Court found notice was adequate and that the notice period exceeded what reasonable standards required and was not too short for objections to be submitted. For adequacy of relief, the Court found the lack of monetary relief did not prevent final approval because the proposed injunctive relief was meaningful to the entire class and the class was not forced to release individual damages claims. Finally, the Court found the fee objections were without merit and elected to address fees later in a separate memorandum.

Callery v. Hop Energy, LLC,

No. 20-cv-3652, 2025 WL 3452362 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2025) (Rufe, J.)

Plaintiffs in a consumer fraud case over heating oil pricing moved for final approval after reaching a settlement, and the Court granted the motion.

In support of its decision, the Court first considered Rule 23(a), finding, with little discussion, that numerosity and commonality were met.

On typicality, the Court analyzed several objections. Objectors claimed that the lead Plaintiff's injury was atypical because not every customer had been injured in the same manner; the Court found no factual support for this claim. The Court also found the Plaintiff had already acknowledged that not every customer was automatically a class member, but that this variation did not undermine the shared legal theory and factual circumstances in the case. Additionally, Plaintiffs were not subject to a unique defense. The Court also noted that although class counsel knew before discovery that Plaintiff's injury was not identical, counsel did not view the variation as sufficiently adverse.

Turning to adequacy, the Court again considered objections, including claims that class counsel lacked experience. Objectors claimed that detailed damages calculations must be presented for a fairness review, but the Court found no supporting case law had been provided. Other objections alleged conflicts from a separate RICO filing, that counsel had taken adverse positions, that the class action had been expanded from an opt-in class, that key information had been omitted, that counsel had missed the certification deadline, that hours spent on the case were too low and that one Plaintiff and counsel had a longstanding relationship. In each instance the Court found no evidence of wrongdoing, impropriety or other hallmarks of inadequacy. Objectors also alleged that another named Plaintiff had been added after preliminary approval, that both Plaintiffs lacked standing for Connecticut claims and that a separate representative was needed for variable-rate customers; the Court found none of these allegations undermined adequacy.

 

Turning to predominance, objectors argued there was no reliable mechanism for excluding uninjured customers, but the Court found these customers were already excluded from the class and that predominance was otherwise met. The Court also found ascertainability was satisfied based on the Defendant's records and class definition.

On superiority, objectors argued the settlement violated orders in separate cases involving negotiations over the same issues. However, the Court found those orders did not prohibit Plaintiffs and Defendant from conducting discussions in this case, and that objectors could not block the settlement because the parties did not continue other global settlement negotiations. Objectors also failed to cite case law or explain why the Court was required to follow orders from another case in another district, where venue for this case was appropriate in the instant Court. Otherwise, the Court found superiority was satisfied by the judicial economy of combining thousands of claimants seeking uncertain compensation into a single adjudication.

Turning to notice, the Court reviewed objections that notice had omitted key factors in the litigation, specific terminology, clear information about pro rata distribution and information about the structure of payments. However, the Court found Rule 23(c)(2) did not require such exactitude and that nothing in the notice was misleading, inaccurate or insufficient.

The Court then turned to fairness under Rule 23(e) and found that class representatives and counsel were adequate and that sufficient discovery had been completed before settlement. The Court found negotiations were at arm's length and the relief was adequate, dismissing objectors' arguments that Defendants could have contributed more money, that counsel's actions had prejudiced the class and that the reserve would end up paying the Defendant. The Court also considered the objection that the settlement might pay the Defendant’s legal fees. The Court found this was a legitimate concern, but noted that Defendant had already agreed to pay those legal fees from other funding sources.