The M365 Threat CISOs Are Underestimating | Kroll

Cyber

November 17, 2026

The M365 Threat CISOs Are Underestimating: From Invoice Fraud to Data Extortion

For much of the last decade, incident response teams often associated Microsoft 365 compromises with business email compromise (BEC). Typically, with business email compromise, an attacker gets into a mailbox and checks whether that user is involved with payments or the finance department, and if they are, intercepts an invoice and swaps the bank details. If there is no obvious financial angle, attackers often use the account to facilitate additional phishing, gather intelligence from email conversations, or target external business contacts. At Kroll, we've investigated thousands of these cases, and it's a playbook we know by heart.

However, this playbook is changing, and most organizations are still defending against the old one.

 

A Pivot from Encryption to Extortion

Over the past 12 to 24 months, ransomware groups have increasingly shifted from encrypting systems to extorting victims through stolen data alone, a trend led by groups like KTA243 (Scattered Spider). Scattered Spider and similar actors increasingly use identity-platform and single sign-on (SSO) compromises to gain access to Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) environments, including Microsoft 365, Salesforce and ServiceNow, where sensitive SharePoint, OneDrive, Outlook and other business data can be harvested for extortion.

At the same time, attackers are increasingly logging in rather than breaking into networks. CrowdStrike's 2026 Global Threat Report found that 82% of detections in 2025 involved no malware whatsoever, up from 51% in 2020, as adversaries lean on valid credentials and native tools instead of custom code.

Looking at the bigger picture, the implication is hard to ignore: there is a clear shift. Increasingly, attackers do not need a zero-day exploit or complex infrastructure compromise to obtain sensitive data. In many organizations, one compromised Microsoft 365 account and a bulk download from SharePoint and Salesforce is enough.

How It Unfolds: An Anonymized Case Study

We've seen this pattern play out in several recent incidents where the objective clearly wasn't invoice fraud or ransomware encryption but was data theft from M365 and connected SaaS environments. In two recent cases, the volume and sensitivity of the data taken from SharePoint and Salesforce was significant enough that paying a ransom became a serious consideration.

The threat actor(s) used passkey-related messaging and phishing domains as part of their activity. This seems to reflect an apparent effort to capitalize on the industry's shift toward more phishing-resistant authentication methods.

Reconnaissance then looks different to classic BEC. Instead of hunting for invoices attackers search SharePoint broadly, sometimes using broad SharePoint searches designed to identify as much accessible content as possible. What’s more, the threat actors used the "My Apps" page in M365 to discover other SaaS applications accessible from the compromised user account via SSO. In recent cases, that was the method used to discover access to Salesforce and ServiceNow, from which a significant amount of business and infrastructure data was ultimately exfiltrated.

Exfiltration frequently occurs through native functionality in the SaaS environments, including sharing links, browser downloads, synchronization tools, report exports and API-based access, rather than traditional malware. In Kroll investigations, we have observed dwell times stretching into months, with significant volumes of data exfiltrated over extended periods. Since these actors often log in from ordinary residential ISPs rather than suspicious VPNs or unusual geographies, the activity blends into the audit logs almost perfectly.

This activity maps closely to named threat groups Kroll actively tracks. CrowdStrike tracks CORDIAL SPIDER as a financially motivated data-theft and extortion adversary active since at least October 2025; its associated identifiers include UNC6671 and BlackFile. Public reporting describes the group as closely aligned with Scattered Spider and the broader Com ecosystem, but not as the same group. Recent reporting also links UNC6671 activity to prominent private-equity, hedge-fund, financial-services and professional-services organizations. The group commonly uses voice phishing calls to direct employees to convincing SSO-themed adversary-in-the-middle phishing pages, then abuses compromised SSO access to search connected SaaS platforms for high-value information and exfiltrate data without deploying ransomware encryption or conventional malware.

Although this technique of voice phishing was historically tied to KTA243, the technique has lately been widely adopted by other actors, likely based on its success rate. In Q2 2025, KTA407 (Luna Moth) shifted from subscription-themed callback phishing to directly calling employees while impersonating internal IT support. The actor used security alerts and data-migration issues as pretexts to persuade victims to join screen-sharing sessions and install legitimate remote-management tools, which were then used to access corporate systems, steal sensitive data and support extortion demands. Kroll also observed that attackers use the Microsoft Teams remote screen control feature to remotely control corporate systems during screen-sharing sessions.

In a more recent campaign in August 2026, Kroll observed a widespread extortion campaign spanning multiple sectors that relied on voice phishing and text messages. The social engineering technique was used to trick employees into submitting credentials to phishing domains with the end goal of exfiltrating and extorting corporate and personal data. This campaign was attributed to KTA536 (Falcon), which has close ties to the extortion group KTA537 (BlackFile). In this case, no ransomware was deployed. Instead, the attackers rapidly exfiltrated large volumes of from cloud storage, including Box and M365 took place. This was then followed by internal extortion demands sent from the compromised employee’s email account.

Why This Risk Is Underestimated

Most organizations still think about M365 compromise primarily in terms of phishing, invoice fraud or email security, overlooking data exfiltration and ransom as the real threat.

That blind spot is compounded by governance gaps, such as:

  • Over-permissioned users and inherited access paths, a habit of sharing an entire SharePoint library rather than a single file (a permission that then sits there indefinitely)
  • Anonymous or external sharing links
  • By default, an M365 environment can allow broad collaboration with external users. However, this default configuration makes it easy for threat actor(s) to reach their goals.
  • Many organizations have no visibility about data and data categories stored on SharePoint, or who can access them.

Kroll Recommends

Reducing this risk must start before an incident happens, not during one:

  • Identity First: Identity threat protection coupled with phishing-resistant (multi-factor) authentication is a foundational control against this pattern.
  • Visibility: Deploy SaaS based threat monitoring capabilities (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon Shield, Defender for Cloud Apps) and ingest M365 audit logs into a SIEM and alert on bulk sharing or download activity.
  • Respond: Containing a SaaS compromise usually means disabling the affected user account, revoking active sessions in the identity provider, and resetting the user’s password and multi-factor authentication methods. In recent incidents, Kroll has seen that applications connected through Single Sign-On (“SSO”) often manage their own sessions. Containment should therefore also include ending sessions directly within each SaaS application.
  • Data Hygiene: Review sharing policies, remove anonymous links, right-size permissions and classify sensitive data.
  • Configuration Hardening: By default, SaaS environments such as M365 are configured to allow broad collaboration with internal and external users, making it easy for threat actor(s) to reach their goals. The configuration of SaaS environments needs to be tailored to the risk profile of an organization to allow as much collaboration as possible, offering end users a frictionless experience and simultaneously enforcing strict security. This includes, for example, restricting access to corporate data only from managed and monitored devices or limiting access to data on a need-to-know basis.
  • End-user Training: Raise awareness of identity-based threats such as phishing, vishing and social engineering, strengthen internal processes so end users know how to distinguish threat actors from legitimate IT personnel.
  • Readiness: Tabletop the single-account-to-SharePoint-exfiltration scenario specifically, not just ransomware encryption

How Kroll Helps: Frontline DFIR and Proactive Hardening

When an Incident Hits

Kroll is the world's largest global incident response provider, responding to more than 3,000 security incidents every year. That frontline experience, including a growing number of M365 data-theft and extortion cases, directly informs how we help clients prepare.

Before an Incident

Kroll's Microsoft 365 Security Assessment is scoped across CrowdStrike Falcon Shield, Entra ID, Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive and Intune to uncover the misconfigurations that turn a single compromised mailbox into a large-scale data exposure. Kroll is also CrowdStrike's 2026 Americas MSSP Partner of the Year and delivers Kroll Responder MDR, powered by CrowdStrike Falcon Complete, pairing frontline advisory and incident response expertise with CrowdStrike's Falcon platform to reduce cloud and SaaS data exposure before attackers find it.

M365 is one of the most exposed data stores most organizations have, and attackers know it. Businesses need to know and understand the updated playbook.

Are you defending yesterday's invoice fraud, or tomorrow's data-extortion event?

Book a Microsoft 365 or cloud data exposure assessment before an incident forces the conversation.

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