How It Unfolds: An Anonymized Case Study
We've seen this pattern play out in several recent incidents where the objective clearly wasn't invoice fraud or ransomware encryption but was data theft from M365 and connected SaaS environments. In two recent cases, the volume and sensitivity of the data taken from SharePoint and Salesforce was significant enough that paying a ransom became a serious consideration.
The threat actor(s) used passkey-related messaging and phishing domains as part of their activity. This seems to reflect an apparent effort to capitalize on the industry's shift toward more phishing-resistant authentication methods.
Reconnaissance then looks different to classic BEC. Instead of hunting for invoices attackers search SharePoint broadly, sometimes using broad SharePoint searches designed to identify as much accessible content as possible. What’s more, the threat actors used the "My Apps" page in M365 to discover other SaaS applications accessible from the compromised user account via SSO. In recent cases, that was the method used to discover access to Salesforce and ServiceNow, from which a significant amount of business and infrastructure data was ultimately exfiltrated.
Exfiltration frequently occurs through native functionality in the SaaS environments, including sharing links, browser downloads, synchronization tools, report exports and API-based access, rather than traditional malware. In Kroll investigations, we have observed dwell times stretching into months, with significant volumes of data exfiltrated over extended periods. Since these actors often log in from ordinary residential ISPs rather than suspicious VPNs or unusual geographies, the activity blends into the audit logs almost perfectly.
This activity maps closely to named threat groups Kroll actively tracks. CrowdStrike tracks CORDIAL SPIDER as a financially motivated data-theft and extortion adversary active since at least October 2025; its associated identifiers include UNC6671 and BlackFile. Public reporting describes the group as closely aligned with Scattered Spider and the broader Com ecosystem, but not as the same group. Recent reporting also links UNC6671 activity to prominent private-equity, hedge-fund, financial-services and professional-services organizations. The group commonly uses voice phishing calls to direct employees to convincing SSO-themed adversary-in-the-middle phishing pages, then abuses compromised SSO access to search connected SaaS platforms for high-value information and exfiltrate data without deploying ransomware encryption or conventional malware.
Although this technique of voice phishing was historically tied to KTA243, the technique has lately been widely adopted by other actors, likely based on its success rate. In Q2 2025, KTA407 (Luna Moth) shifted from subscription-themed callback phishing to directly calling employees while impersonating internal IT support. The actor used security alerts and data-migration issues as pretexts to persuade victims to join screen-sharing sessions and install legitimate remote-management tools, which were then used to access corporate systems, steal sensitive data and support extortion demands. Kroll also observed that attackers use the Microsoft Teams remote screen control feature to remotely control corporate systems during screen-sharing sessions.
In a more recent campaign in August 2026, Kroll observed a widespread extortion campaign spanning multiple sectors that relied on voice phishing and text messages. The social engineering technique was used to trick employees into submitting credentials to phishing domains with the end goal of exfiltrating and extorting corporate and personal data. This campaign was attributed to KTA536 (Falcon), which has close ties to the extortion group KTA537 (BlackFile). In this case, no ransomware was deployed. Instead, the attackers rapidly exfiltrated large volumes of from cloud storage, including Box and M365 took place. This was then followed by internal extortion demands sent from the compromised employee’s email account.