Mon, Dec 5, 2022

AvosLocker Ransomware Update: Backup Targeting and Defense Evasion Techniques

Mitre ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic
Technique
Procedure
TA0001
T1190
AvosLocker threat actors exploited ManageEngine ADSelfService
T1021
AvosLocker utilized RDP to move laterally
T1486
AvosLocker encrypted data
T1490
AvosLocker deleted backups
TA0007
T1049
AvosLocker threat actors used whoami and net user to conduct initial internal scouting
TA0005
T1135
AvosLocker attempted to enumerate network shares
TA0011
T1211
AvosLocker attempted to hide activity by exploiting vulnerabilities within Veeam
TA0010
T1090.002
AvosLocker used the Chisel Proxy to tunnel traffic
TA0011
T1048
TA0004
T1219
Avoslocker used AnyDesk to maintain persistence and command and control
TA0008
T1068
AvosLocker utilized the created webshell to create a local administrator account
TA0040
T1078
AvosLocker identified valid domain administrator accounts and were able to switch accounts

Recommendations

Recommendation
Observation
Patch and update ManageEngine ADSelfService devices and Veeam backup & replication services
The ManageEngine service was compromised and allowed remote code execution.
The threat actor attempted to hide activity by utilising the Veeam Backup and Replication service.
Disable plaintext passwords
The threat actor was able to access credentials
that were stored in plaintext
Monitor PowerShell execution
Ensure PowerShell is logged and create detections for encoded script execution
The threat actor utilised PowerShell execution
Audit user, administrator and service accounts
Ensure accounts have the correct access and privileges. Implement the principle of least privilege.
The exploitation allowed the threat actor to operate with a highly privileged account which could add extra administrator accounts.
Implement multifactor authentication
Multifactor authentication can restrict access to sensitive areas and can prevent lateral movement.
The threat actor was able to access all areas of the network.
Implementing multifactor authentication would assist with limiting lateral movement and access to sensitive areas
Review backup strategies
Ensure multiple backups are taken and at least one backup is isolated from the network.
The threat actor deleted backups that were attached to the network

Indicators of Compromise

The following files and hashes have been identified for the incident.

File Name
Comment
MD5 Hash Value
scanner.exe
Netscan
e0e0e26fb4a78c1d2e0479d073a7cc13
veeamcp.exe
Veeam Copy Tool
6a93af683d14d726c7b4f2e80601f711
veeamdl.exe
Veeam Download
5dc568b8e4f111b84baaf9018a82c56d
chisel.dll
Chisel Proxy
9f07042085f8e127dab3d003fe04d002b8ad8340
Stop.jar
Java Archive to create webshells
CE442BBADE3A3C482C2D288D177B6589
help.jsp
webshell
775DC9F35BF5057904FB7D6F58795946
3.txt
AvosLocker Binary
7a15c01fa77f79120e2918618fcba5b3
AVO.ps1
AvosLocker binary encoder script
022532c575fa9f8157e920bd2d34f2ec
The following external IP addresses were observed during the incident:
IP Address
Comment
178.17.170[.]23
Tor Node
188.166.119[.]212:80/byebye
Cobalt Strike

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