


Conducting Efficient Insider Threat Investigations using KAPE

September 2020 Private and Confidential



Notes:

 Session is being recorded, You'll receive access to the recording in a couple days



We'll try to answer as many questions as possible

Upcoming KAPE Intensive Training and Certification

SCHEDULE	INSTRUCTORS
	Eric Zimmerman
September 30, 2020	Mari DeGrazia
10:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m. (EST)	Sean Straw
	Scott Zuberbuehler
October 8, 2020 8:00 am – 5:00 pm (BST)	Paul Wells
	James Thoburn

- Virtual live sessions
- Max 25 students

bit.ly/kape2020


About Tony & Aaron

- Senior Vice Presidents at Kroll
- Former in-house experience leading insider threat investigations

Overview



Insider Threat Investigations



Collection Efficiency



Analysis Efficiency



KAPE Case Studies

WHICH INCIDENTS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED YOUR ORGANIZATION IN THE LAST YEAR? *



17% KROLL IR CASES RELATED TO UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

Insider Threat Investigations | Why Does This Matter?

- What is insider threat intentional/unintentional
- Based on management, policies, etc.
- Plethora of scenarios this affects everyone, etc.
- Time is of the essence
- Exigent circumstances departing employees (NDAs, non competes, etc.), leaving the country, etc.
- ROI = Time = more investigations

KAPE

Collection Efficiency

Collection Efficiency | Overview

- KAPE targets key forensic artifacts required for analysis and runs in a matter of minutes
- Can be used for remote and/or automated collections
- Can be shared on a USB for single-click collections for non-technical users
- Can send to various destinations, including SFTP, S3, etc.

Collection Efficiency | !BasicTargets


Category	Target File Contents
Event Logs	Windows Event Logs
Evidence of Execution	Prefetch RecentFileCache Amcache Syscache
File System	\$MFT \$LogFile \$UsnJrnI:\$J \$Secure:\$SDS \$Boot \$Tops:\$T
LnkFilesAndJumpLists	User Jumplist directories User Office Recent .LNK files User Recent and Desktop .LNK files Restore Point (XP) .LNK files

Collection Efficiency | !BasicTargets

Category	Target File Contents
PowerShellConsole	ConsoleHost_history.txt
RecycleBinMetadata	Contents (including deleted files) of User Recycle Bin folders
RegistryHives	User (including UsrClass.dat) and system Registry hives and transaction logs
ScheduledTasks	SchedLgU.txt and scheduled task files
SRUM	Contents of Windows\System32\sru folder
ThumbCache	User thumbcache_*.db files
USBDevicesLogs	Setupapi.log and Setupapi.dev.log
WindowsIndexSearch	Windows.edb


Collection Efficiency | Build a KAPE Package

Default KAPE Files & Folders (~150 MB)





Files & Folders Needed for Triage Collection (< 10mb)




Collection Efficiency | _kape.cli

--tsource C: --tdest .\%m --target !BasicCollection --vhdx %m

Argument	Value	Description
tsource	C:	Use C:\ as the collection source
tdest	.\%m	Write output to subfolder named by hostname in directory where KAPE is run
target	!BasicCollection	Use the !BasicCollection set of Targets
vhdx	%m	Write output into a VHDX file named by the hostname

Collection Efficiency | Running KAPE



Collection Efficiency | Storage/Transfer Options

- Local drive (USB)
- Network share
- Transfer to SFTP, S3, Azure, etc.

KAPE

Analysis Efficiency

Analysis Efficiency

```
Description: 'LECmd: process .lnk files'
Category: FileFolderAccess
Author: Eric Zimmerman
Version: 1
Id: 1b66f0e2-2ccf-449c-ae02-a1b3dc59df08
BinaryUrl: https://f001.backblazeb2.com/file/EricZimmermanTools/LECmd.zip
ExportFormat: csv
Processors:
```

```
Executable: LECmd.exe
CommandLine: -d %sourceDirectory% --csv %destinationDirectory% -q
ExportFormat: csv
```

```
Executable: LECmd.exe
CommandLine: -d %sourceDirectory% --html %destinationDirectory% -q
ExportFormat: html
```

```
Executable: LECmd.exe
CommandLine: -d %sourceDirectory% --json %destinationDirectory% -q
ExportFormat: json
```

What are Modules?

- The actual "processing" of the artifacts you collected
- Grouped in Categories

Can be Tailored

- What works for someone may not work for you
- Special Programs/Scripts can be utilized

Creating a Module

- Benefits of KAPE:
 - Open Sourced
 - Well Documented
 - Modules written in YAML
 - Frequently Updated by Community
 - Internally Created do not need to be shared
 - Select the Result format for your needs
 - Automation and Speed
 - Small Storage Footprint

- Creating the Internal Toolkit:
 - Proprietary based Investigations
 - Create Case Specific Modules
 - » Run certain processes for certain investigations
 - If its Command Line, you can run it

KAPE

Case Studies

- Intellectual Property Theft
- Exceeding Authorized Authority
- Custom Targets

Case Study – Intellectual Property Theft

- A senior engineer recently left the company and created his own business with a competing product offering.
- You are requested to determine if evidence exists that the engineer took data leading up to their departure.
- Artifacts of Interest:
 - USB Devices
 - File/Folder Access
 - Program Execution

Case Study – Intellectual Property Theft – USB Devices

Module: Registry\RECmd

HiveType 🔽	Description 💌	Category 💌	KeyPath	Deleted	🕶 LastWriteTimestamp 💌
			\ControlSet001\Enum\USBSTOR\Disk&Ven_	_	
System	USB Devices	USB Devices	SanDisk&Prod_Extreme&Rev_0001	FALSE	03/27/2018 09:22:22
			\ControlSet001\Enum\USBSTOR\Disk&Ven_	_	
			SanDisk&Prod_Extreme&Rev_0001\AA0102	1	
System	USB Devices	USB Devices	5170355310594&0	FALSE	03/27/2018 09:22:22
			\ControlSet001\Enum\USBSTOR\Disk&Ven_		
			SanDisk&Prod_Extreme&Rev_0001\AA0106	0	
System	USB Devices	USB Devices	3160707470215&0	FALSE	03/27/2018 09:22:22

Module: Event Logs

TimeCreated	🕴 Eventid 💌	Channel 🗾	MapDescription	PayloadData3	▼
03/27/2018 09:22:1	.3 1006	Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic	USB Insertion/Removal	ParentId: USB\VID_	0781&PID_5580\AA010215170355310594
03/27/2018 09:22:2	2 1006	Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic	USB Insertion/Removal	ParentId: USB\VID_	0781&PID_5580\AA010603160707470215
03/27/2018 09:56:2	2 1006	Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic	USB Insertion/Removal	ParentId: USB\VID_	0781&PID_5580\AA010603160707470215
03/27/2018 12:11:4	2 1006	Microsoft-Windows-Partition/Diagnostic	USB Insertion/Removal	ParentId: USB\VID_	0781&PID_5580\AA010215170355310594

Case Study – Intellectual Property Theft – File/Folder Access

Module: File-Folder Access\Shellbags

AbsolutePath	🖌 CreatedOn 🛛 💌	ModifiedOn 🔽	FirstInteracted 💌	LastInteracted 💌
Desktop\D:\			3/27/2018 9:22	3/27/2018 9:22
Desktop\D:\\Project-912328	1/12/2018 15:31	12/20/2017 11:12		
Desktop\D:\\Project-547891	2/1/2018 11:14	12/16/2017 16:22		
Desktop\D:\\Project-672341	3/11/2018 14:50	3/1/2018 12:50		3/27/2018 9:23
Desktop\D:\\Project-672341\Schematics	3/11/2018 14:51	3/1/2018 21:12		3/27/2018 9:23
Desktop\D:\\Project-672341\Project_Plan	3/11/2018 14:52	3/1/2018 11:34	3/27/2018 9:23	3/27/2018 9:23
Desktop\D:\\Project-672341\Parts	3/11/2018 14:53	3/1/2018 11:34		
Desktop\E:\			3/27/2018 9:23	3/27/2018 9:50
Desktop\E:\\Project-672341	3/27/2018 9:23	3/1/2018 12:50		3/27/2018 9:50
Desktop\E:\\Project-672341\Schematics	3/27/2018 9:24	3/1/2018 21:12		
Desktop\E:\\Project-672341\Project_Plan	3/27/2018 9:25	3/1/2018 11:34		
Desktop\E:\\Project-672341\Parts	3/27/2018 9:26	3/1/2018 11:34		

Case Study – Intellectual Property Theft – Program Execution

Module: Registry\UserAssist

BatchValueName	ProgramName	💌 RunCounter 💌	LastExecuted 🚽
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\abgrcnq.rkr	{System32}\notepad.exe	7	03/27/2018 09:23:15
Zvpebfbsg.ZvpebfbsgRqtr_8jrxlo3q8oojr!ZvpebfbsgRqtr	Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe!MicrosoftEdge	2 1	03/27/2018 09:28:51
P:\Hfref\wpybhql\Qbjaybnqf\vafgnyyonpxhcnaqflap.rkr	C:\Users\jcloudy\Downloads\installbackupandsync.exe	1	03/27/2018 10:40:33
P:\Hfref\wpybhql\Qbjaybnqf\Renfre 6.2.0.2982.rkr	C:\Users\jcloudy\Downloads\Eraser 6.2.0.2982.exe	1	03/27/2018 10:43:48
P:\Cebtenz Svyrf\Renfre\Renfre.rkr	C:\Program Files\Eraser\Eraser.exe	1	03/27/2018 10:51:12
P:\Hfref\Choyvp\Qrfxgbc\Renfre.yax	C:\Users\Public\Desktop\Eraser.Ink	1	03/27/2018 10:51:12

Case Study – Exceeding Authorized Access

- Alert received for IT employee emailing sensitive data outside of the company.
- You are requested to determine what the materials are and where they came from.
- Artifacts of Interest:
 - LNK Files
 - \$MFT

Case Study – Exceeding Authorized Access – File/Folder Access

Module: FileFolderAccess\LECmd

SourceFile	SourceCreated 💌 So	urceModified 🔽 WorkingDirectory	MachineID
D\users\djones\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\	6/6/2020 11:45	6/6/2020 11:45 \\dt-cperry\c\$\users\cperry\Desktop\Profile Pic.jpg	dt-cperry
Recent\Profile Pic.jpg			
D\users\djones\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\	6/6/2020 11:47	6/6/2020 11:47 \\dt-cperry\c\$\users\cperry\Documents\Taxes\2019\Perry Taxes.pdf	dt-cperry
Recent\Perry Taxes.pdf			
D\users\djones\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\	6/6/2020 11:51	6/6/2020 11:51 \\dt-cperry\c\$\users\cperry\Documents\Projects\HR\EmployeeDetails20200101.xlsx	dt-cperry
Recent\EmployeeDetails20200101.xlsx			
D\users\djones\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\	6/6/2020 9:37	6/6/2020 9:37 \\dt-Ijones\c\$\users\Ijones\Documents\All.Employee.Listing.2020-03-01.csv	dt-ljones
Recent\All.Employee.Listing.2020-03-01.csv			
D\users\djones\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\	6/6/2020 12:49	6/6/2020 12:49 \\lt-sjohnson\c\$\users\sjohnson\OneDrive\Documents\Pics\Img6001.jpg	lt-sjohnson
Recent\Img6001.jpg			
D\users\djones\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\	6/6/2020 12:53	6/6/2020 12:53 \\lt-sjohnson\c\$\users\sjohnson\OneDrive\Documents\Pics\Img5123.jpg	lt-sjohnson
Recent\Img5123.jpg			
D\users\djones\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\	6/6/2020 12:54	6/6/2020 12:54 \\lt-sjohnson\c\$\users\sjohnson\OneDrive\Documents\Pics\Img5124.jpg	lt-sjohnson
Recent\Img5124.jpg			

Case Study – Exceeding Authorized Access – File/Folder Access

Module: FileSystem\MFTECmd_\$MFT

ParentPath	▼ FileName	💌 Extension 💌	Created0x10	Created0x30	🖞 LastModified0x10 💌 L	.astModified0x30 💌
.\Users\djones\Downloads\Tickets\cperry	Profile Pic.jpg	.jpg	06/06/2020 11:4	5 06/06/2020 11:4	5 03/30/2020 22:49	03/30/2020 22:49
.\Users\djones\Downloads\Tickets\cperry	Perry Taxes.pdf	.pdf	06/06/2020 11:4	7 06/06/2020 11:4	7 05/02/2020 14:01	05/02/2020 14:01
.\Users\djones\Downloads\Tickets\cperry	EmployeeDetails20200101.xlsx	xlsx	06/06/2020 11:5	1 06/06/2020 11:5	1 01/03/2020 08:00	01/03/2020 08:00
.\Users\djones\Downloads\Tickets\ljones	All.Employee.Listing.2020-03-01.csv	.CSV	06/06/2020 09:3	7 06/06/2020 09:3	7 03/01/2020 16:24	03/01/2020 16:24
.\Users\djones\Downloads\Tickets\sjohnsor	n Img6001.jpg	.jpg	06/06/2020 12:4	9 06/06/2020 12:4	9 5/27/2020 9:12	05/27/2020 09:12
.\Users\djones\Downloads\Tickets\sjohnsor	Img5123.jpg	.jpg	06/06/2020 12:5	3 06/06/2020 12:5	5/1/2020 14:32	05/01/2020 14:32
.\Users\djones\Downloads\Tickets\sjohnsor	Img5124.jpg	.jpg	06/06/2020 12:5	4 06/06/2020 12:54	4 5/1/2020 14:32	05/01/2020 14:32
.\Users\djones\Downloads\Tickets	tickets_6-6-20.7z	.7z	06/06/2020 13:3	7 06/06/2020 13:3	7 06/06/2020 13:37	06/06/2020 13:37

Case Study – Custom Target/Modules

- Corporate Proprietary Investigation
 - Not an IR Event
- Geographically separated
 - No Travel permitted
- User may have stored IP in folders throughout the OS Structure
 - Files had a unique file extension
- Needed to be as forensically sound as possible
 - Kape created .zip file + password protection

Case Study – Custom Target/Modules – What We Did

- Created a unique Target that would look for specific file extension
- Created a unique Module for fast processing of specific artifacts
- Remoted into the machine when the user had the machine on network
- Initiated KAPE Target to pull the artifacts
- Ran KAPE Module to process the artifacts needed, which included a nice file listing
- On the machine for less than 10 minutes
- Processing of the Targeted artifacts took even less than that
- Customer was provided preliminary reports within 8 hours of our involvement

Case Study – Custom Target/Modules – Quick Wins

- Insider Threat allegation was substantiated very quickly
- Amount of dwell time was minimal
 - customer was not even prepared for returned results
- No Expenses
 - Saved thousands of dollars alone on no expenses needed
- Internally proved the tool could be leveraged for more than just IR
 - Tailoring to specific files relevant to the matter
- Tailoring the tool saved countless hours on the target system
 - User never knew we were there

Questions



For More **KAPE**: Intensive Training and Certification

Virtual live sessions

Max 25 students

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