International anti-corruption conventions: Do they work?
Most countries have at least begun initiatives to combat corruption, often based on one of the current international anti-corruption conventions. These treaties are designed to address the global character of the problem through cooperation and to help bridge gaps in domestic policy. In the past ten years, eight major conventions have been signed, including: the United Nations Convention Against Corruption; the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions; the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption; and the American Convention Against Corruption.
In recent years, many governments have asked Kroll to assess their anti-corruption programs, giving us a unique perspective on the efficiency of these international instruments. In global terms, their chief benefit has been the promotion of an agreed framework for policy and institutional reforms. At the national level, a clear benefit is that ratifying states are also held accountable for implementing such strategies. Indeed, future European Union funding will be affected by member states’ performance in relation to that body’s own convention.
National governments also use these conventions to signal to domestic and foreign audiences their commitment to a tough anti-corruption policy, which encourages foreign investment. Moreover, states have used ratification of such treaties to build momentum for change across a wide range of local constituencies when such initiatives might otherwise have been blocked.
Any convention, however, is a product of consensus worked out mostly by politicians. The result is often a watered-down compromise. Moreover, some governments may ratify these instruments but not sincerely implement them, whether through lack of resources, political sensitivities, or because ratification was a diplomatic exercise to please donor governments rather than a serious commitment. Least-common-denominator pledges, too often insincere, are insufficient to fight the increasingly complex and international phenomenon of corruption.
The degree to which anti-corruption protocols enhance cooperation between law enforcement agencies is the key element in their effectiveness. The most significant and wide-reaching treaty to date is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which took effect in 2005. Uniquely so far, it goes beyond providing an anti-corruption framework to address the fundamental realities for the seizure, freezing and, most importantly, repatriation of assets. The latter is particularly important for those developing countries whose wealth has been expropriated by corrupt officials.
Asset recovery remains one of the most important criteria for judging the effectiveness of international cooperation at the investigative and legal levels. Despite some successes, and while the UN convention certainly helps, the record in this field is still wanting. Much of the problem stems from the deposit of most proceeds of corruption in developed countries where laws relating to freezing, confiscation, and repatriation orders are complex and procedurally rigorous. Many victimized developing countries simply lack the resources and legal capabilities to trigger the procedural mechanisms in developed states to get back their stolen assets.
In fact, unable to afford advanced domestic financial intelligence and anti-corruption units, developing states seeking asset recovery through these complex legal avenues often fail to satisfy the evidential levels required in the international conventions.
The UN Convention, like similar instruments, is an important tool, but much remains to be done. Future negotiations should consider reducing the number of international agreements, which have sometimes contradictory approaches and can leave governments confused over which to ratify or which best matches their own domestic legal models. Above all, however, any international framework is insufficient on its own. The will of an individual country will ultimately determine the success of its anti-corruption program.
![]() | Charles Carr is head of fraud prevention and anti-corruption for Europe, Middle East and Africa. He was previously head of the Milan office and country manager for Mexico and specializes in fraud prevention programs and training. He previously spent time as an oil futures broker for Kidder Peabody. |

Global Fraud Report
Issue 7 - January 2009
- It's a different world out there, and fraudsters know it
- Preparing for the litigation storm
- People in glass houses... The coming battle between companies and activists
- Fast times in a hot property market: Frauds which contributed to today's financial crisis
- Whistle-blowers in China: What companies need to know
- The financial crisis and emerging markets: Heightened opportunities, heightened risk
- Cheating in a bear market: Short and distort
- How fighting fraud saves money: Examples from Brazil
- International anti-corruption conventions: Do they work?
- Cleaning up: The latest crisis and Southeast Asia
- Potential legal pitfalls of transnational internal investigations
- The FCPA and international due diligence: Meeting the challenges of doing business abroad


